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EQUALITY BETWEEN THE SEXES IN THE 1980'S*
NANCY S. ERICKSON**
I. INTRODUCTION
A NY DISCUSSION OF EQUALITY UNDER THE LAW must necessarily
revolve around the equal protection clause. Therefore, this discus-
sion will indicate first where equal protection analysis has succeeded in
effectively dealing with sex discrimination and the significance of the
judicial policy behind these successes. Secondly, the failures of the equal
protection clause will be examined with specific attention to the five
methods in which the equal protection clause has failed to eliminate
laws discriminating on the basis of sex. Finally, the failures of the equal
protection clause will be illustrated as starting points for work in the
area of sexual equality in the 1980's.
II. SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE SUCCESS OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
Since Reed v. Reed' in 1971, equal protection cases have developed to
the point where it can now be stated that formal legal equality between
* This article is an expanded version of a speech delivered at the Conference
on Equality sponsored by the Society of American Law Teachers in New York City
on December 14, 1979.
** Associate Professor of Law, the Ohio State University College of Law.
A.B., Vassar College; J.D. Brooklyn Law School; LL.M., Yale Law School.
1 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Reed was the first sex discrimination case in which the
Court departed from the deferential "rational basis" test. Although it did not find
fault with the state's objective--administrative efficiency in choosing estate ad-
ministrators-the Court held that a preference for males over females was an
"arbitrary" means to obtain that goal. Id. at 75. Cf. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464, 466 (1948) (law prohibiting all women except wives and daughters of bar
owners from tending bar was upheld as rationally related to the state's interest
in protecting women from the "moral and social problems" that might "confront a
barmaid without such protecting oversight").
Between its decisions in Reed and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the
Court's direction in sex discrimination cases was unclear. In Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677, 681 (1973), a plurality of the Court held that sex was a suspect
classification. That view, however, has not been adopted by a majority of the
Court. The following year, in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), the Court ap-
peared to retreat to the traditional rational basis test when it upheld a nine-
teenth century paternalistic statute that provided a property tax exemption to
widows as well as blind and disabled persons, but failed to provide such an ex-
emption for widowers. The Court held that the sex classification was substantially
related to its "benign," "compensatory" purpose of "cushioning the financial im-
pact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately
heavy burden." Id. at 355. See notes 45-56 infra and accompanying text. Shortly
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women and men is the general rule. Ordinarily, the law may not dis-
tinguish between similarly situated women and men solely on the basis
of sex. The law may classify on the basis of sex where the state can
demonstrate that there is an important governmental objective and that
the sex classification bears a substantial means-ends relationship to that
important governmental objective. This test has become known as the
"Craig test," having been first enunciated in Craig v. Boren.2
The Craig test is not the suspect classification test used in racial
discrimination cases,' nor does it seem to be the rational basis test."
Many commentators have described it as a middle-tier test.5 It applies
after Kahn, another law that discriminated against men was upheld in Schles-
inger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975). See notes 28-30 and 57-60 infra and accompa-
nying text.
At this juncture, it looked as though the Court might establish two different
equal protection tests for sex discrimination cases: a heightened level of scrutiny
for laws that harmed women and a more deferential standard of review for laws
that harmed men or that were "benign" and "compensatory" in their effect upon
women. In Wienberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), a male plaintiff claimed
sex discrimination where the Social Security statute that was challenged gave
"mother's benefits" to the surviving wife of a wage earner to allow her to stay
home to care for a child, but not to the surviving husband of a deceased female
wage earner. The Court found it unnecessary to decide which of the two stand-
ards of review should be applied because it viewed the law as discriminating
against deceased female wage earners and their children, rather than against the
male surviving spouse. The Court also rejected a "benign," "compensatory" pur-
pose test of the statute since it did not find such purpose to be the actual ra-
tionale behind the statute's enactment. As a result, the statute was simply held
unconstitutional under Frontiero. Id. at 642.
Finally, in Craig, the Court clarified the standard of review to be used in sex
discrimination cases and indicated that that standard would be applied whether
the statute harmed males or females. See notes 5-7 infra and accompanying text.
The Craig test has been applied in all subsequent cases, including a case in which
the Court found that the law in question was constitutional because of its
"benign," "compensatory" purpose. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1976).
Thus, in sex discrimination cases, one uniform standard is applicable in all in-
stances. Cf. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978)
(although "strict scrutiny" is usually applicable in race discrimination cases, the
more lenient Craig standard applies to those race cases in which affirmative ac-
tion programs are being challenged).
2 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
' See, e.g., Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Forward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Justice Powell, recognizing that some will view the Craig
test as a "'middle-tier' approach," prefers to call it rational basis in "sharper
focus." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 210, n.*. Justice Burger, dissenting in Craig,
did not agree that gender should be treated as a "dis-favored classification." Id.
at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist, complaining that the majority
[Vol. 28:591
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regardless of whether the plaintiff is male or female, and whether the
statute harms or purports to help women.'
Many statutes have failed to meet this test. In Craig, the Court stated
that highway safety was an important governmental objective, but that
the sex-based age differential for purchasing 3.2% beer (18 for women,
21 for men) was not substantially related to achievement of that object-
ive.' In Califano v. Goldfarb,' the Court did not have to reach the
substantial relationship issue because it did not find an important
governmental objective underlying the Social Security requirement that
a male surviving spouse prove dependency on the deceased wage earner
while a female surviving spouse was presumed dependent. The alleged
governmental objective was based on the "archaic" presumption that
wives were always dependent on husbands and husbands were always
breadwinners. In Orr v. Orr,9 the Court considered three possible impor-
tant governmental objectives for women-only alimony statutes. The
first was maintenance of stereotyped sex roles, which the Court discarded
as not constituting an important governmental objective. The second
and third objectives were helping needy spouses and making up for past
discrimination against women. As to these two, .the Court held that
there was not a substantial relationship between the sex classification
in the statute and the asserted governmental objectives because there
was an individualized hearing in every case in which alimony was re-
quested." A divorce court could consider these asserted governmental
interests at the hearing with the result that any presumption that
women were needier than men would be unnecessary. Similarly, in
Caban v. Mohammed," the Court found that promoting the adoption of
created the Craig standard "out of thin air," viewed the standard as falling
somewhere between rational basis and compelling state interest. Id. at 221
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The requirement of an important governmental objective (end) seems to be
somewhere between the "compelling state interest" standard for suspect classifi-
cations and the deferential standard under the rational basis test, ie., the end
must merely be "valid." Likewise, the Craig test requires that the means-ends
relationship be "substantial" rather than "necessary" or simply "rational." How-
ever, some of this verbiage may be more misleading than informative. For exam-
ple, in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), the Court stated that the compelling
state interest standard should be applied to classifications based on alienage, but
then explained in a footnote, "[tihe state interest required has been characterized
as 'overriding,' . . . ; 'compelling,' . . .; 'important,' . . . or 'substantial,' .... We at-
tribute no particular significance to these variations in diction." Id. at 722 n.9
(citations omitted). Thus, the "ends scrutiny" may be the same under the Craig
test as under the compelling state interest test.
6 See note 1 supra.
429 U.S. at 200.
430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977).
9 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
10 Id. at 281.
11 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
19791
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children born out-of-wedlock was an important governmental objective,
but that there was not a substantial relationship between this important
governmental interest and a sex-based statute which required consent
of the mother for adoption, but not the consent of the father. Finally, in
Califano v. Westcott,11 the Court held that even if the state's alleged im-
portant governmental objective--to induce indigent fathers not to
desert their families-was the actual reason for the statute, granting
welfare benefits to families where the father becomes unemployed, but
denying those benefits to families where the mother becomes unem-
ployed, was not substantially related to the achievement of the alleged
governmental objective. The incentive to desert was the same in each
situation.
The policies advanced within these cases are significant. In essence,
the Court has declared war on sex stereotyping by law. In Westcott, the
Court stated that a sex classification "cannot survive" if it is "part of
the 'baggage of sexual stereotypes' ... that presumes the father has the
'primary responsibility to provide a home . . .' while the mother is the
'center of the home and family life.""' Similarly, the Court in Orr realized
that sex classifications are dangerous per se, even if the classifications
are based on rational reasons, because they may perpetuate stereotyped
thinking." In other words, the law has an important educational function
to perform. If the law applies to some people in a stereotyped fashion,
then the general public will believe that this is proper and will also
treat such people in the same manner.
Under the Craig test 5 it is expected that many other sex-based laws
will fall in the 1980's. Examples of these are: the father's common law
duty to pay child support;"0 the common law rule that when the husband
moves the wife must follow or she will be guilty of abandonment; 7 the
common law duty of the wife to do housework and care for the
children; 8 and various other laws that will be discovered when state and
12 443 U.S. 76 (1979). The Court did not believe that the purported objective
for the statute was the actual purpose, but found that even the purported object-
ive was not substantially related to the sex classification in the statute.
is Id. at 89. Five Justices concurred in the opinion; all nine Justices concurred
in the holding of unconstitutionality.
1, 440 U.S. at 283.
1 See note 1 supra.
'" Several courts have already held this type of statute unconstitutional. See,
e.g., Carter v. Carter, 58 App. Div. 2d 438, 397 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1977).
17 This is still the rule in New York, although some lower courts are attempt-
ing to modify it. See, e.g., Weintraub v. Weintraub, 78 Misc.2d 362, 356 N.Y.S.2d
450 (Fam. Ct. 1974).
18 In New York, for example, a wife who fails to carry out these duties may be
divorced for "constructive abandonment" of her husband. See, e.g., Rosner v.
Rosner, 202 Misc. 293, 108 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1951).
[Vol. 28:591
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federal statutes are processed through computers. 9
Unfortunately sex-based laws will not fall of their own weight. Litiga-
tion and legislation will be necessary to change them, requiring huge ex-
penditures of time, money and effort.
20
III. SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE FAILURE OF THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
There are five ways in which the equal protection clause has failed to
eliminate laws that discriminate on the basis of sex. First, the require-
ment that women and men be "similarly situated" has been manipulated
by the Court. 21 Second, in certain cases the Court has failed to find sex
discrimination because the two groups that were treated differently did
not consist of a group of women on the one hand and a group of men on
the other, but rather consisted of women on the one hand and both men
and women on the other.2 Third, the Court has held that certain laws
pass muster under the Craig test.23 Fourth, the Court's application of
the disparate impact theory in sex discrimination cases has had a
devasting effect on the effort to remove sex-based discrimination. 2'
Finally, the equal protection clause does not address areas of the law
where there is formal equality but actual inequality. 5 In a sense, this
last failure may not be a defect in the equal protection clause. If the
equal protection clause simply requires formal equality then one cannot
fault it for not going further. However, the issue of whether the equal
protection clause does require more than formal equality is still open to
question.26
'9 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SEX
BIAS IN THE UNITED STATES CODE (1977).
' The Equal Rights Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), would be a more efficient way of dealing
with sex-based laws. The E.R.A. would become effective two years after ratifica-
tion. Presumably most state legislatures would take advantage of this period to
identify and amend their laws which result in sex discrimination.
The E.R.A. would also outlaw some varieties of sex discrimination that might
survive the Craig test. See notes 86-89 infra and accompanying text and Vor-
cheimer v. School District of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (separate but equal sex segregated
public schools are not unconstitutional). The E.R.A. would make sex a prohibited
rather than a suspect classification. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The
Equal Rights Amendment. A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women,
80 YALE L.J. 871, 889 (1971).
z' See notes 27-40 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 41-44 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 45-88 infra and accompanying text.
z, See notes 89-106 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 107-12 infra and accompanying text.
See generally Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of
Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 WIs. L. REV. 55, 106-07. See also the excellent arti-
1979]
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A. The Requirement that Male and Female be "Similarly Situated"
In two cases, the Supreme Court has held that the women and men
who were treated differently under the law were not similarly
situated;' as a result, the appropriate test of the law's constitutionality
was not the Craig test but the simple rational basis test. In the first
case, Schlesinger v. Ballard,28 a male naval officer challenged the Navy's
"up and out" provisions regarding promotions. The provision for women
officers required promotion or discharge within thirteen years. The pro-
vision for male officers required discharge if a male was passed over for
promotion three times, which usually occurred in less than thirteen
years. The Court held that female officers were not similarly situated to
male officers because there were many restrictions on a female officer's
opportunities to compile records entitling the officer to promotion. For
example, women were not permitted in combat nor eligible for seaduty
other than on hospital ships and transports." As the dissent pointed out,
these restrictions on women's opportunities were probably unconstitu-
tional." Therefore, the Court appeared to be holding that the male and
female officers were not similarly situated because the women were be-
ing treated in an unconstitutional manner, and thus it was rational for
Congress to give the women a longer promotion time to make up for the
fact that they were not similarly situated.
The second case, Parham v. Hughes,3 is more disturbing than Ballard
because it was decided in 1979. In Parham, a plurality of the Court
cle by Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Work-
ing Mothers, 59 B.U.L. REV. 55 (1979).
7 The basic equal protection doctrine provides that the equal protection
clause does not become operable unless the persons dissimilarly treated under
the challenged statute are similarly situated. See Tussman & TenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 344 (1949). If they are
dissimilarly situated, this may be reason enough for treating them differently.
Justice Stewart was the author of both of the two "dissimilarly situated"
cases: Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) and Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S.
347 (1979). Interestingly, it seems the only other justice to discuss the "similarly
situated" requirement was Justice Rehnquist dissenting in Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762 (1977):
For equal protection does not mean that all persons must be treated
alike. Rather, its general principle is that persons similarly situated
should be treated similarly. But that statement of the rule does little to
determine whether or not a question of equality is even involved in a
given case. For the crux of the problem is whether persons are similarly
situated for purposes of the state action in issue. Nothing in the words of
the Fourteenth Amendment specifically addresses this question in any
way.
Id. at 780 (emphasis in original).
419 U.S. 498 (1975).
Id. at 508. See 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1970).
419 U.S. at 511 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
441 U.S. 347 (1979).
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upheld a Georgia statute that allowed an unwed mother to sue for the
wrongful death of her child, but disallowed an unwed father to sue
unless he had procured a court order legitimating the child." The plain-
tiff father had signed the child's birth certificate, had contributed to its
support and had visited it, but he had never secured a court order
legitimating the child. The plurality held that this was not sex discrimi-
nation because unwed fathers and unwed mothers are not similarly
situated.2
The Court offered two reasons for this holding. First, under Georgia
law only an unwed father could sue to legitimate the child; the unwed
mother could not. This rationale, like that offered in the Ballard case,'
is also probably unconstitutional,35 yet it was used as the Court's basis
for finding that unwed mothers and fathers were not similarly situated.
The second reason the plurality gave for its holding that unwed mothers
and fathers were not similarly situated was that the mother actually
gave birth to the child and the father did not, hence the identity of the
mother is always ascertainable. 6 Any uncertainty as to the identity of
the father, however, can be eliminated by the father legitimating the
child. Therefore, the law actually discriminates between those fathers
who had legitimated their children and those fathers who had not
legitimated their children. Under the rational basis test, the Court
found that the requirement of legitimation was rational, especially con-
sidering the danger of spurious wrongful death claims brought by men
who would not be the child's actual father. 7
This reasoning may lead to unjust results in two particular kinds of
cases. First, there are those cases involving different treatment of unwed
mothers and fathers in adoption laws. In Caban v. Mohammed" the
Court found unconstitutional a New York law that deprived the unwed
father of the right to prevent the adoption of his child by another, a
right afforded the unwed mother. However, the children involved in
Caban were not infants, and the majority implied that it might rule dif-
ferently if the law concerned the adoption of only newborn out-of-
wedlock children with no psychological ties to the father. 9 The second
Id. The plurality consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Rehnquist, and Stevens.
Id. at 355.
, See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
441 U.S. at 355 n.7.
Id. at 357.
441 U.S. 380 (1979).
Id. at 389. See W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 862 (Ct. App. 1979), where the court upheld a law giving the right to con-
sent to adoption to all unwed mothers, but only to those unwed fathers who had
acknowledged their children and received the children into their homes. The
court stated: "To the extent that this classification is based upon gender, it is based
19791
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type of case in which the reasoning offered in Ballard and Parham could
lead to inequitable results in child custody cases. In this situation there
is a danger of the Court upholding a preference for the mother when the
child is an infant on the theory that since the child is born of her body,
she is psychologically closer to the child and, thus, the mother and the
father are not similarly situated. Justices Stevens, Burger and Rehn-
quist implied in Caban that they could accept this theory.'
B. Cases Finding the Groups Legally Distinguished
are not Entirely of One Sex
The most flagrant example of this type of reasoning is the pregnancy
disability benefits case, Geduldig v. Aiello."' The Court, in its infamous
footnote twenty, stated that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabili-
ties from the state's disability benefits statutes did not distinguish be-
tween women and men; it merely distinguished pregnant people from
non-pregnant people and, as a result, sex-based discrimination did not
exist.42
Parham v. Hughes43 could also be explained as falling within this
category. One could say that the Court viewed the statute as creating
two distinct categories: one consisting of unwed mothers plus "legiti-
mated" unwed fathers, and the other consisting of "non-legitimated"
unwed fathers. Again, this would not be discrimination between men
and women, so only the rational basis test would be applicable."
C. Cases Involving Statutes That Meet the Craig Test
Thus far, in all of the cases that have met the Craig test, the alleged
important governmental objective has been one of compensating for
past discrimination against women, ie., an alleged affirmative action
purpose. In Kahn v. Shevin," a property tax exemption for widows, but
not widowers, was upheld by the Court on this theory. In Schlesinger v.
Ballard," different promotion procedures for women and men naval of-
upon an actual difference in situation. Whatever else may be said of an unwed
mother, she is not a stranger to her child. A gender-based classification is not im-
proper where men and women are not similarly situated." Id. at 312, 160 Cal.
Rptr. at 869.
441 U.S. at 405.
417 U.S. 484 (1974).
, Id. at 496 n.20.
43 441 U.S. 347 (1979). See notes 31-37 supra and accompanying text.
" 441 U.S. at 356-57. Abortion law challenges on sex discrimination grounds
could also arguably fail under similar reasoning. The theory would be that the
discrimination is not between men and women, but between pregnant people
wanting abortions on the one hand and everyone else in the world on the other.
, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See note 1 supra.
0 419 U.S. 498 (1975). See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
(Vol. 28:591
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ficers were upheld on the same theory. Finally, social security retire-
ment benefits that were higher for women than those for men with com-
parable earnings were upheld by the Court in Califano v. Webster 7 on
the theory that Congress had intended the higher social security
benefits to compensate for past discrimination against women in the job
market.
The statutes in the Kahn,48 Ballard,"5 and Webster5 decisions should
not have been upheld for two reasons. First, the Craig test, as
elaborated in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,51 requires the Court to
evaluate a challenged law on the basis of the actual reasons for which it
was enacted, and not any reasons that can be hypothesized at the time
the statute is challenged.2 Yet, in all three of these cases, the Court ac-
cepted reasons that, upon further scrutiny, can be shown to have been
hypothesized.
The tax exemption in Kahn clearly was not enacted to compensate
women for sex discrimination in the job market or for sexism in society
in general.53 Justice Stevens perceptively analyzed the Kahn statute in
his concurring opinion in Califano v. Goldfarb:54
[T]hat case involved a discrimination between surviving spouses
which originated in 1885; a discrimination of that vintage cannot
reasonably be supposed to have been motivated by a decision to
repudiate the 19th century presumption that females are in-
ferior to males. It seems clear, therefore, that the Court upheld
the Florida statute on the basis of a hypothetical justification
for the discrimination which had nothing to do with the
legislature's actual motivation. 5
The real legislative purpose underlying the Kahn statute was the pater-
nalistic assumption that married women do not work outside the home,
and that if they attempt to do so they will not be able to support their
17 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam).
, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See FLA. STAT. § 196.202 (Supp. 1974-1975).
,9 419 U.S. 498 (1975). See 10 U.S.C. § 6382 (1976).
10 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam). See 42 U.S.C. § 415 (1976).
51 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
52 Id. at 648. Thus, the test used in Wiesenfeld and Craig must be a higher
level of scrutiny than rational basis because under that deferential standard, the
court may consider any valid purpose for upholding the statute even if the
legislature never had that purpose in mind when it enacted the statute.
See notes 1 and 47 supra.
5, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). No other Supreme Court
Justice has ever suggested that Kahn be overruled, not even Justices White,
Brennan, and Marshall, who dissented in Kahn.
' Id. at 223 (footnote omitted).
1979]
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families because they are inherently physically and mentally incapable
of doing so.5
Similarly, the legislative history of the Ballard statutes gives no in-
dication that they were enacted to counterbalance discrimination
against women in the Navy. The different treatment of men and women
with regard to Navy promotion policy may well have been the result of
simple congressional inadvertence. 7 Additionally, this discrimination
against women in the Navy was officially allowed to continue at the
same time that the Navy was purportedly attempting to compensate for
such past discrimination." Five years later, in the women-only alimony
case,59 the Court made an observation that would be equally applicable
to Ballard:
[Appellee argues] that while "[t]he common law stripped the
married woman of many of her rights and most of her property ...
it attempted to partially compensate by giving her the assur-
ance that she would be supported by her husband." . . . This
argument, that the "support obligation was imposed by the com-
mon law to compensate the wife for the discrimination she suf-
fered at the hands of the common law," . . . reveals its own
weakness. At most it establishes that the alimony statutes were
part and parcel of a larger statutory scheme which invidiously
discriminated against women, removing them from the world of
work and property and "compensating" them by making their
designated place "secure." This would be reason to invalidate
the entire discriminatory scheme-not a reason to uphold its
separate invidious parts."0
Under this analysis, even if the Ballard statutes were enacted for a
"compensatory" purpose, they "were part and parcel of a larger
statutory scheme which invidiously discriminated against women;'' 1
restricting their opportunities to demonstrate their promotion-
worthiness, and then "'compensating' them by making their designated
place 'secure."' 62
" See the discussion of the legislative history of the Kahn statute in
Erickson, Kahn, Ballard, and Wiesenfeld: A New Equal Protection Test in
"Reverse" Sex Discrimination Cases? 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 13-18 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Erickson II]. Cf., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (in-
herent physical inferiority of women).
5' Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 517 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
Erickson II, note 56 supra at 19-30.
See Erickson II, note 56 supra at 29-30.
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
Id. at 279 n.9 (emphasis added). It is also possible that the Kahn statute
could be criticized in the same manner. See note 48 supra.
1 440 U.S. at 279 n.9.
62 Id.
[Vol. 28:591
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The Webster statute' was also not enacted for the "benign," "com-
pensatory" purpose of making up for past wage discrimination against
women. The statute was passed because employers were forcing women
to retire earlier than men and were also failing to hire older women.
Congress believed that employers would continue to discriminate
against women in these ways, hence it reduced the Social Security
retirement age for women (but not men) to sixty-two years, and allowed
women to compute their benefits in such a way as to result in higher
benefits than those for similarly situated men.' At the same time,
however, Congress failed to enact legislation forbidding such discrimina-
tion by employers, thus treating the symptoms rather than the disease.
The foreseeable side effect of the Webster statute was that
employers could use the Social Security law as justification for a contin-
uing failure to hire women who were approaching the age of sixty-two
and forcing female employees to retire earlier than men, even when the
women preferred to forego increased Social Security payments in favor
of continued paychecks. 5 Such discriminatory practices by private
employers were finally outlawed by Title VIP6 and the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act."7 In 1972, when Title VII was extended to
cover public employers, Congress also equalized the Social Security
retirement ages and benefit compensation methods for women and
men. 8 It would have been extremely embarrassing for Congress to
allow the Social Security Administration to continue to treat women
and men differently when Congress had prohibited private and public
employers from doing so. As a result, the side effects of these "pur-
portedly compensatory 'classifications in fact penalized women'." '69
There is a second reason why the statutes in the Kahn and Webster
decisions should not have been upheld by the Court. Even if the statutes
truly had been enacted for the "benign," "compensatory" purpose of
making up for past discrimination, the sex classifications in the statutes
were not "substantially related" to the achievement of that objective."0
The Kahn statute is both overinclusive and underinclusive. It gives a
tax exemption to widows who have not suffered financially from sex
discrimination, yet denies it to married and single women who have suf-
fered from discrimination.7 ' The Webster statute is overinclusive in that
42 U.S.C. § 415 (1976).
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 319 (1977).
Id. at 319 n.7.
42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1976).
67 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976).
See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977).
69 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 n.11 (1979).
. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
71 See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. at 360 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting);
Id. at 361 (White, J., dissenting).
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increased benefits are paid to all retired women workers, even those
who might have been fortunate enough to escape the effects of sex
discrimination in employment."2
Finally, lest it be argued that in University of California Regents v.
Bakke73 at least a plurality of the Court upheld affirmative action as con-
stitutional, and that the above statutes are affirmative action statutes,
the distinction between these purportedly "benign," "compensatory"
statutes and true affirmative action programs must be clarified.
Affirmative action in the employment sector may provide individuals
previously discrimination against with an edge in securing a job, but if such
person does not work, he or she loses any benefits that could be obtained
from that initial edge. Likewise, affirmative action in the educational
sector may provide an edge in securing acceptance into a school, but the
student still has to achieve a sufficient academic standing in order to re-
main and eventually graduate. Providing financial assistance to compen-
sate for past discrimination is not affirmative action, it is simply a
monetary payment. It is analogous to a recovery in a Title VII 4 case for
wages lost because of discrimination, except that the payment is
granted without any finding that the recipient was in fact discriminated
against, and similarly without a determination as to the amount of
damages. The Court in Bakke upheld a certain type of affirmative action
program, but Bakke cannot serve as precedent for "benign compensa-
tion" cases. For example, the Court should not uphold higher social
security benefits for blacks than for whites on the theory of counter-
balancing past discrimination. 5
In a recent case, Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co.,"6 the
United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify the "benign
compensation" theory. Wengler was a challenge to a workers' compen-
sation law that presumes a widow to be dependent upon her deceased
worker husband, but requires a widower to prove dependency. The
Supreme Court of Missouri held that the law has a valid compensatory
purpose, citing Kahn v. Shevin.77 In an amicus brief, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg argued that the Court should go further in Wengler and hold
72 Perhaps this subclass of women workers would be very small or even
nonexistent. However, the fact that some women were "penalized" by the statute
(see note 64 supra and accompanying text) is reason enough to overturn it. See
note 69 supra and accompanying text.
13 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
1- 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 (1976).
15 Cf. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 362 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (facetious-
ly suggesting a tax "break" for all members of minority groups to remedy past
discrimination).
76 48 U.S.L.W. 4459 (Apr. 22, 1980), rev'g 583 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. 1979).
"7 583 S.W.2d at 165.
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sex to be a suspect classification."8 She argued that this result was com-
manded by the fact that the Court already had been treating sex
discrimination cases in such a manner."9 In reversing the Missouri
Supreme Court and rejecting sex as a suspect class, the Court applied
the Craig test and held that although providing for needy spouses is an
important governmental objective, the state had not met its burden of
showing that the sex-based law bears a substantial relationship to that
objective."
The Court did not explain how the Wengler statute could be
distinguished from the Kahn statute. It discussed Kahn only in a foot-
note:
In Kahn v. Shevin, the Court upheld a Florida annual $500 real
estate tax exemption for all widows in the face of an equal pro-
tection challenge. The Court believed that statistics established
a lower median income for women than men, a discrepancy that
justified "a state tax law reasonably designed to further the
state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss
upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately
heavy burden." As in Kahn we accept the importance of the
state goal of helping needy spouses .... but as described in the
text the Missouri law in our view is not "reasonably designed"
to achieve this goal. Thus the holding in Kahn is in no way
dispositive of the case at bar. l
This implies that the Kahn statute was "reasonably designed" to
achieve its goal. However, if its goal was to "help needy spouses," it is
no less constitutionally infirm than the Wengler statute. If the goal of
the Kahn statute is reformulated in terms of "cushioning the financial
impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss imposes a
disproportionately heavy burden," (translation: providing financial
assistance to widows) then by definition the means are well suited to
achieving the ends, but the ends are sex discriminatory.
Another explanation must be sought for Kahn. It cannot be explained
as a tax statute (where the state has more leeway) because it was followed
in Ballard and Webster, neither of which is a tax case.82
7" Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae at 50-51,
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 4459 (Apr. 22, 1980).
, Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae at 44-51.
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 4459, 4462 (Apr. 22,
1980).
1 48 U.S.L.W. at 4461 n.4 (citing Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974)).
" One could attempt to distinguish Kahn, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975); and Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) from Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975) and Wengler, 48 U.S.L.W. 4459 (Apr. 22, 1980). All were alleged to be
"benign compensation" cases, but in the latter cases the woman was working and
had a right to expect that her work would benefit her family in the same way
1979]
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With regard to the Court's failure to find sex a suspect classification,
some of the Justices had previously expressed the belief that the courts
should allow the political processes to make that decision through the
Equal Rights Amendment, which had been passed by Congress and
seemingly would be ratified by the required number of states. 3 Now,
however, there is substantial question whether the Equal Rights
Amendment will ever be ratified. 4
Without the Court holding sex a suspect class, some other laws in-
volving sex discrimination may be held to pass the Craig test. As the
law now stands, in sex discrimination cases the state need not show a
compelling state interest, just an important governmental objective. In-
terestingly, the only governmental objective that the Court has ever
found not important enough was the reinforcement of rigid sex roles in
marriage rejected in Orr.85 When the Court has found laws unconstitu-
tional under the Craig test, it has usually done so on the theory of lack
of a substantial relationship between the sex classification in the statute
and the important governmental interest, ie., an insufficiently close
means-ends relationship."
The Court might hold that some sex classifications are substantially
related to important governmental interests. For example, under the
Craig test, Dothard v. Rawlinson"7 could result in the same holding as it
did under the Title VII theory. The Court could decide that the impor-
tant governmental interest involved was the maintenance of order in a
prison. It could then find a substantial relationship between such in-
terest and a law prohibiting women from being in contact positions as
that a man's work would benefit his family. Thus, to discriminate against her
male family members is to discriminate against her also. In the former cases, on
the other hand, men were complaining that women were receiving benefits that
men did not get. However, the Court believed that no woman was being harmed
either by being deprived of derivative benefits for her family members or in any
other way. Thus, the statute actually operated to benefit women without harm-
ing any women. Even if that is so, however, I would still urge that Kah7, Ballard,
and Webster are wrong for the other reasons that I have detailed in notes 45-75
supra and accompanying text.
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, Blackmun,
and Burger, JJ., concurring).
, Thirty-five of the necessary thirty-eight states have ratified the E.R.A., but
three of these have voted to rescind their earlier ratification. The constitutional-
ity of such a rescission is an open question. The period for ratification was,
however, extended to June 20, 1982.
5 440 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1979). In fact, this may not even be a valid purpose:
"Discrimination or segregation for its own sake is not, of course, a constitution-
ally permissible purpose." In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 n.8 (1973).
" See notes 5-14 supra and accompanying text.
433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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prison guards, because women by their "very womanhood" arouse men
to sexual attacks.8
D. Disparate Impact Cases
The fourth area in which the equal protection clause has failed to
eliminate laws discriminating on the basis of sex is the area of disparate
impact analysis. The Court in Washington v. Davis9 held that adverse
impact on a protected class is insufficient to invalidate a law under the
equal protection clause. Discriminatory intent must be found. This
holding was obviously a serious disappointment to civil rights ad-
vocates. However, a later case, Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,"
was, in a sense, even worse. In Feeney, the Supreme Court upheld an
absolute, lifetime veteran's preference in civil service jobs. The Court
upheld the preference even though it knew that until 1967 there was a
two percent quota on women in the military. 2 Other restrictions con-
tinued until the 1970's, and some even exist today.2 As a result, not only
were women prevented from entering the military, but they were
punished in job seeking because they had not been in the military. The
Court acknowledged that the veteran's preference had a devastating im-
pact on the employment opportunities of women,94 however it held that
" Id. at 345. The Court decided Dothard v. Rawlinson on a Title VII theory,
holding that the exclusion of women from the prison guard "contact" position was
not a violation of Title VII because male sex is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion for the job (based on the notion that women attract sexual assaults).
However, Rawlinson was also litigated and appealed as an equal protection case.
It is possible that the equal protection clause may provide more protection than
does Title VII, although the opposite seems to be more often the case. Compare
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, prohibits the use of tests or other measures
of intellectual competence if those tests have the impact of excluding minorities
despite the employer's lack of discriminatory intent unless the employer can prove
that the tests in question are substantially related to job performance) with
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that, for equal protection
claims, proof of discriminatory intent was necessary, while for statutory cases
proof of discriminatory impact was sufficient). But the Court did not have to con-
sider the constitutional question because "[tihe parties [did] not suggest ... that
the Equal Protection Clause requires more rigorous scrutiny of a state's sexually
discriminatory employment policy than does Title VII." 433 U.S. at 334 n.20.
8 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Id. at 239.
91 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
Id. at 269 n.21.
g See Army Officials Alarmed by Drop in Number of Women Recruits, N.Y.
Times, April 1, 1979, § 1, at 49, col. 3; Should Women See Combat? N.Y. News,
March 25, 1979, at 65, col. 1.
" Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 271.
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the preference did not violate the Constitution because it passed muster
in both steps of what the Court described as a "two-fold inquiry.""
First, the law was sex-neutral not only on its face but also in fact; it
was not a "pretext" for discriminating against women, but was truly
enacted to benefit veterans." Second, although the statute had a
disparate impact on women, there was no evidence that even the
slightest discriminatory intent was a motivating factor in its
enactment. 7 The plaintiffs had argued that the defendant should be held
to intend the "natural and foreseeable consequences" of the law in terms
of its impact on women. In other words, disregard for the harm that
the law would inflict on women's employment opportunities should be
held the equivalent of discriminatory intent. The Court disagreed,
stating that in order to invalidate a law that has a disparate impact on
women, a court must find that it was enacted "because of" its invidiously
discriminatory impact on women, not just "in spite of" that impact.9
The Feeney definition of intent thus puts a very heavy burden of proof
on the plaintiff in an adverse impact case. This is especially true when
one considers that a legislator who intends to harm women is unlikely to
admit such motivation,"' and that he undoubtedly would not have passed
the law if he had been a member of the group that it harmed.''
The pregnancy discrimination cases, notably General Electric v.
Gilbert °2 and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,0 3 are other examples of the
failure of the disparate impact theory in sex discrimination cases.
However, a full discussion of these cases is outside the scope of this
paper, so they are mentioned only for the sake of completeness. 4
Id. at 274.
"Id.
Id. at 274-75.
" Id. at 278. Justice Stevens had favored this definition of intent in his con-
curring opinion in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., con-
curring).
442 U.S. at 279.
See Perry, Modern Equal Protection. A Conceptualization and Appraisal,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1036-40 (1979).
"I See Ely's "we-they" analysis, which is an extension of the "discrete and in-
sular minorities" concept found in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933 (1973). (His application of the we-they analysis to
Roe v. Wade, however, is flawed. Fetuses may not sit in the state legislatures,
but males, who cannot get pregnant, do). See also J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971).
12 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
13 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
I" See Erickson, Pregnancy Discrimination: An Analytical Approach, 5
WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 83 (1979). The disparate impact theory was never ad-
vanced by the plaintiffs in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), because they
believed it to be a disparate treatment case. Disparate impact was alleged in
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss4/5
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It seems certain that under such analysis, challenges to many other
laws that have a discriminatory impact would also fail. For example, the
common law marital property rule has an extremely disproportionate
impact on women."0 5 Likewise, the failure to treat as deductible
General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), however, the Court found that,
contrary to the common-sense notion of impact, there was no disparate adverse
impact on women. The majority stated:
The Plan ... is nothing more than an insurance package, which covers
some risks, but excludes others .... The "package" . . . is facially non-
discriminatory in the sense that "there is no risk from which men are
protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which
women are protected and men are not." [Geduldig] ... [Tlhere is no proof
that the package is in fact worth more to men than to women ....
Id. at 138.
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), the Court found that depriv-
ing workers of their accrued seniority after they returned from childbearing
leave did have an adverse impact on women:
[The Company's] policy denied [plaintiff] specific employment oppor-
tunities that she otherwise would have obtained. Even if she had
ultimately been able to regain a permanent position with petitioner, she
would have felt the effects of a lower seniority level, with its attendant
relegation to less desirable and lower paying jobs, for the remainder of
her career with [the Company].
Id. at 141. The Court further stated that the gas company "has not merely refused
to extend to women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive [as in Gilbert],
but has imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer." Id. at
142. The result in F atty is clearly correct, but unfortunately it leaves the Gilbert
holding unimpaired.
105 See Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the Realization of Educational
Goals: How the Law Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 WIs. L. REV. 947 (1978).
The marital property laws of the various American jurisdictions can be
broken down into three main categories: strict common law, modified
common law, and community property. In the eight strict common law
property jurisdictions, a divorce court has no power to take property
belonging to one spouse and award it to the other. Because married
couples usually commingle their property, the courts in these states are
often faced with the difficult task of deciding, according to the usual
legal principles, who owns a particular piece of property. Once that deci-
sion is made, however, the court's jurisdiction is at an end.
In the thirty-six modified common law property jurisdictions, the
court has power to distribute some or all of the property of the parties,
usually only property acquired during the marriage, according to the
principles and standards set by the applicable statute. Because the
statutes of most of these jurisdictions do not specify the exact percent-
age of the marital property that the courts must award to each spouse,
but grant considerable discretion to the courts to distribute the prop-
erty in accordance with some broad standard of justice and equity, the
modified common law property jurisdictions are sometimes called
"equitable distribution" jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions provide no fur-
ther guidelines to the court, while others specify the criteria to be used.
In the nine community property jurisdictions, ownership of all property
acquired during the marriage, with certain exceptions in each jurisdic-
tion, vests immediately upon acquisition in the "community." This is a
19791
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"business expenses" the child care costs necessary to allow the parent
to be gainfully employed has a devastating effect on the incomes of
working mothers. 06 Nevertheless, under the Feeney theory such laws
would probably be upheld.
E. Areas of Formal Equality but Substantive Inequality
Our entire working society can be interpreted as being structured on
the assumption that people do not bear or care for children and do not
have household responsibilities. As a result, for example, law professors
are expected to put in long hours of teaching, research and writing to
impress the tenure committee, but law professors who give birth to
children or who want to have a hand in raising their children are usually
not given any consideration in terms of lighter loads (even for "lighter
pay"), longer tenure tracks, etc.
In the 1980's, methods must be developed to deal with these pro-
blems. Some are already in progress in a small way: reduced hours,
flexi-time, child care facilities and other ways of taking into account the
fact that workers are indeed members of families.0 7
Other solutions are only on the drawing boards. For example, one
commentator has some very intriguing suggestions with regard to over-
time pay laws. 0 8 She postulates that if Congress determined that
equalization of sex roles was to be the public policy of the country, Con-
gress could work toward that goal by eliminating the "professional
employees" exclusion from overtime compensation laws. The result
would be a dampening of the employer's enthusiasm for "workaholics"
and a concomitant increase in the amount of leisure time enjoyed by
professional workers, most of whom are male. Male professional em-
ployees would then be able to spend more time on parenting, and
thereby female professional employees, especially those with children,
civil law concept similar to the common law concept of a trust. During
the marriage, both spouses have ownership of the community, and upon
divorce, the assets and liabilities are distributed according to the stand-
ards prescribed in the statutes.
Id. at 961-62 (footnotes omitted).
Thus, in the strict common law states, the woman who plays the role that
society encourages women to play, ie., the role of housewife and mother, would
usually end up, upon divorce, with no property at all. If the husband's money
went into the bank accounts, other forms of savings, house, furniture, etc., the
wife would not be entitled to these upon divorce, absent a gift to her.
The strict common law marital property rule, therefore, has a very heavy
adverse impact on women. However, it is not sex-based and thus not subject to
constitutional attack under Craig.
104 Child care expenses are a credit against taxes owed, but there is a fairly
low ceiling. I.R.C. § 44A. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
11 E.g., the Section on Women in Legal Education of the Association of
American Law Schools is conducting a study of part-time law teaching.
10" See note 26 supra.
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would have more opportunities for advancement because they would not
suffer from unfair competition from males without parenting respon-
sibilities.
Another example of formal equality but substantive inequality is il-
lustrated by the failure of the Equal Pay Act' 9 to help the majority of
women workers. For example, the Equal Pay Act provides that if one
hires two nurses, one male and one female, for the same work, the
employer must pay them the same wages. Likewise, if one hires two
garbage collectors, one male and one female, to do the same work, the
employer must also pay them the same wages. Simply to state the
above is to highlight the problem. Nursing, secretarial work, and some
other professions hire virtually all female workers. These professions
composed mostly of women are generally paid less because they are
women's professions. In other words, the wages of women in sex-
segregated jobs are artifically depressed while sex-segregation in the
job market has not been shrinking over the past years.
There is, however, a ray of hope for the 1980's. This is the concept of
comparable pay for work of comparable value. The theory behind this
concept is that in "women's jobs," wages are artificially depressed,
therefore these jobs should be evaluated in terms of their skill, effort
and responsibility. One must compute what "male jobs" are of com-
parable skill, effort and responsibility, and then pay women in the
"female jobs" the amount they would receive if they were in the com-
parable "male jobs." The legal basis on which this attack is being waged
is that Title VII prohibits discrimination in compensation, ' therefore
paying artificially depressed wages to women who are in "female jobs"
is a form of discrimination in compensation.
There was a nation-wide conference in October, 1979 on the issue of
comparable pay for work of comparable value, and the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission is planning to hold hearings on the
issues. " ' One case has already accepted the above theory as a possible
109 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976) which reads in pertinent part:
Prohibition of sex discrimination. (1) No employer having employees sub-
ject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any
establishment in which such employees are employed, between em-
ployees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on
jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and respon-
sibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions ex-
cept where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor
other than sex....
110 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1976).
... Connolly & Copus, Developments in EEO and OSHA Law, 183 N.Y.L.J. 5
(1980), reports that the hearings proposed for early in 1980 have been postponed.
Id at 2, col. 3.
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Title VII claim. '12 Thus, there is reason to believe that the 1980's will bring
some successes where the 1970's have failed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sex discrimination is a fairly recent and controversial legal problem
area and, as a result, certainty is the exception rather than the rule.
Formal legal equality between men and women seems to be guaranteed
after Reed v. Reed"' and its progeny, but the equal protection clause
has still failed in five ways to eliminate laws which discriminate on the
basis of sex. The "similarly situated" requirement, the various statutory
groupings of men and women, the incongruent application of the Craig
test, the disparate impact theory, and the areas where formal equality is
present but actual equality is lacking are all problems which must be
identified and remedied. The courts can no longer take a passive or
restrictive role. As we enter the 1980's, sex discrimination will rise to
the forefront and the courts must be ready to deal actively with these
problem areas. With the equal protection clause as the vehicle by which
sex discrimination can be eliminated, the courts are provided the
machinery to achieve this goal, but the goal can only be attained if the
law is fairly and judiciously applied.
"' Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979).
1 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See notes 1-20 supra and accompanying text.
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